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We present the results of our review of some forty community-level interventions
undertaken in the developing world over the past twenty years m order to reduce
malnourishment in children. We argue that such interventions, if they are considered as
social experiments, cannot be assimilated to models of quasi-experimental method. We
propose an alternative model of experimentation, which we call "reflection-in-action"
which seems to us better suited to account for the kinds ofvahdity and rigor attainable in
situations such as these.
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Social experimentation is central to the idea of liberal social reform.
Reform suggests progress, which suggests societal learning, and our
main image of societal learning is that of experimentation. Patrick
Moynihan saluted the American Bicentennial, for example, by asking,
&dquo;What have we learned? It is two centuries now since the American
people commenced what they very well understood to be an experiment
in liberty&dquo; (Moynihan, 1976). To ask what we have learned is to assume
a &dquo;we&dquo; capable of learning, a &dquo;something&dquo; capable of being learned, and
an image of &dquo;learning&dquo; attributable to a whole society. To see the
American people as having &dquo;commenced an experiment in liberty&dquo; is to
see them as having deliberately embarked on a course of exploratory
action, a social experiment involving human beings whose thoughts and
feelings might affect the outcomes of action, and a collective inter-
vention aimed at changing things for the better. In this threefold sense,
an American experiment in liberty is an intervention experiment.
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For many years now, the idea of intervention experiment has been an
idea in good currency. Republican as well as Democratic administra-
tions have couched their proposals for reform in the language of exper-
imental social problem-solving. Yet whenever governmental actions
have been taken seriously as experiments, controversies have arisen over
the interpretation of their results. What changes actually occurred?
Were they really attributable to governmental intervention? What les-
sons ought to have been drawn? Among social scientists, such contro-
versies have led to the view that governmental actions conceived as
experiments should be rigorously designed as such. Yet on the rare
occasions when this has been attempted, the interpretation of experi-
mental results has been no less controversial. Indeed, the feasibility of
intervention experiments has become a subject of controversy in its own
right.
Those who advocate rigorously designed social experiments rely on
models of inquiry derived from laboratory experiments in the social
sciences. Their view of experimental rigor emphasizes quantitative
methods, randomized samples, and experimental controls. They assume
that social reality can be decomposed into measurable variables whose
causal connections are lawful and predictable. They hold that social
researchers must free themselves from their biases in order to make their
experimental procedures and results replicable. Through iterative
experimentation, they believe, it is possible to discriminate among
competing theories of social reality so as to arrive at cumulative, consen-
sual, and convergent knowledge. Of course, they recognize that the
experimenter never completely controls his environment and they some-
times respond to administrative and political constraints by seeking out
limited domains of intervention suitable for rigorous experimentation.
The critics of this view of social experiment note that policy conflicts
often reemerge in debates over the interpretation of experimental find-
ings. They observe that policy issues have a way of slipping out from
under research; by the time the results of an experiment are available,
policymakers are no longer interested in them. And some of these critics
eschew rigorous controls and quantitative precision in favor of qualita-
tive, narrative methods of inquiry appropriate to description of the
intervening social processes that link inputs to outputs (see Rein and
Weiss, 1970). They advocate action research in which practitioners
double as experimenters, short-circuiting the tenuous process by which
social experimentation is supposed to influence policy.z But action
researchers tend to leave hard questions dangling. What model of
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knowledge underlies their method of inquiry? Do they aim at general,
policy-relevent conclusions? If so, how do they deal with the confound-
ing &dquo;uncontrollables&dquo; that plague social experiments conceived on the
model of the natural sciences?
The idea of intervention experiment poses a dilemma of rigor or
relevance. We must choose, apparently, between rigorous social exper-
imentation that cannot be applied to matters of real-world importance
and methods of experimentation that are applicable but hopelessly
nonngorous.
More than twenty years ago, Donald Campbell not only described
this dilemma but proposed a solution to it (Campbell and Stanley, 1963:
20). He imagined a spectrum at one pole of which he placed the &dquo;true
experiment&dquo; of the natural sciences and at the other, the &dquo;dirty&dquo; methods
of action research. Between these extremes, he proposed a middle
ground of &dquo;quasi-experimental method&dquo;-a patched-up approximation
of true experiment which, even if it fell short of the ideal, might still
produce generalizable causal inferences useful in the formation of public
policy. For this heresy, he was roundly taken to task by social scientists
committed to the natural science model.
Over the last twenty years, a great deal has happened to justify a
reconsideration of Campbell’s quasi-experimental model. Several large-
scale interventions designed as rigorous social experiments have led to
ambiguous results, refueling the controversy over social experimenta-
tion. And in the same period, positivist assumptions have fallen into
disrepute.3 There has been a growing interest in the continental explora-
tion of hermeneutics, phenomenology, and critical method.
In this article we shall revisit the vexed questions of intervention
experiment, quasi-experimental method, and action research, focusing
on the domain of interventions aimed at reducing malnourishment in
the developing world, a domain torn by controversies of its own. In the
years following World War II, the United States undertook massive
programs of food distribution and supplemental feeding-apparently
unexceptionable interventions that were subsequently criticized as
causes of dependency and black-marketeering. As the problem of mal-
nourishment became increasingly visible and urgent, it triggered a
&dquo;Rashomon&dquo; of conflicting diagnoses. Depending on the profession or
ideology of the observer, malnourishment has been seen as a problem of
diet, agricultural productivity, water quality, health care, population
control, land ownership, economic policy, or social justice. Attempts to
synthesize these several diagnoses have been inconclusive. In the design
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of nutrition interventions, some physicians and engineers have tried to
conform to canons of experimental rigor, while other workers have seen
themselves as compassionate fighters in a war against hunger. Even for
the former, the rural villages and urban squatter settlements of develop-
ing countries, unstable and relatively uncontrollable, have presented
massive impediments to rigorous experimentation.
Over the past four years, we have carried out a study of community-
level nutrition interventions throughout the world (reported in Drake et
al., 1980). Intending initially to learn what kinds of intervention worked,
and under what conditions, we found it necessary to reflect on our
underlying models of efficacy and rigor in social experimentation.
True Experiment and Quasi-Experimental Method
In Campbell’s well-known analysis, intervention experiment consists
of manipulating certain variables in order to observe the effects of
manipulation on other variables. In an experiment on the effects of
alternative teaching methods on children’s reading scores, for example,
the experimenter tests an intervention hypothesis of the form &dquo;X pro-
duces D,&dquo; where &dquo;X&dquo; is an experimental treatment (a particular use of
phonics, for example) and &dquo;D&dquo; is an intended difference between pre-
and posttest observations of a dependent variable (reading scores, for
example). An inference from experimental findings has &dquo;internal valid-
ity&dquo; if and only if, in the specific experimental instance, results to the
experiment are shown to be incompatible with all other plausible
accounts of the observed change in dependent variables-that is, when
the intervention hypothesis has been shown to be more resistant to
refutation than its competitors. Threats to internal validity include
confounding events that occur between pre- and posttests, maturation
of persons or systems observed, and selection biases (Campbell, 1969).
The method of &dquo;true experiment&dquo; is intended to counter such threats by
the use of control groups and randomization. True experiments must
conform to the following principles:
( 1 ) Predesign: Hypotheses and conditions of experiments must be specified
prior to intervention so as to make it possible to identify and randomize
the selection of control and experimental groups.
(2) Isolation: Both experimental and control groups must be isolated from
all changes in the environment except those already included in
experimental design.
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(3) Constancy: Experimental and control groups must be kept constant
throughout the experiment, except insofar as they are intended to
change.
(4) Quantitative precision: In order to permit discrimination among rival
hypotheses, both hypotheses and results of the experiment must be
expressed in quantitative terms.
(5) Distance: Both the subjects of experimental treatment and the practi-
tioners who deliver it should be kept unaware of experimental design and
distant from analysis of its results, lest they depart from design or distort
analysis.
Quasi-experimental method is intended for use in the imperfectly
controlled world of social interventions where true experiment is impos-
sible. Its strategy is &dquo;to generate ... as many plausible rival hypotheses as
possible and then to do the supplementary research that would discrim-
inate among those hypotheses (Campbell and Stanley, 1963: 5). The
experimenter makes time-series observations where the effects of exper-
imental treatment may show up as a &dquo;discontinuity in the measure-
ments,&dquo; employs nonrandomized control groups, and &dquo;patches&dquo; exper-
imental designs by adding features to &dquo;control specific factors, more or
less one at a time&dquo; (1963: 53).
Both &dquo;true&dquo; and quasi-experiments are intended to provide a basis for
generalized policy advice. The experimenter seeks not only internal
validity but &dquo;external validity&dquo;-that is, valid generalizability to settings
other than the experimental one. The experimenter operates under a
schema of generalization (our term), seeking to establish the truth of an
intervention hypothesis for all contexts similar in the relevant aspects to
the experimental one.
Campbell’s treatment of experimental validity rests on certain
assumptions about the kind of knowledge we can get about social reality
and about the features of social reality that enable us to know it. He
assumes, first of all, that social phenomena are lawful, that &dquo;the closer
two events are in time, space, and measured value on any or all dimen-
sions, the more they tend to follow the same laws&dquo; (Campbell and
Stanley, 1963: 18). Although in any particular instance we may guess
wrong, the laws governing social phenomena are assumed to be in the
phenomena, &dquo;there&dquo; to be discovered.
On this basis, Campbell also believes in the possibility of objective
knowledge of social phenomena-knowlege where truth is independent
of the values or biases of the researcher. The researcher does not
construct the laws he or she discovers, nor are they linked in any special
way to the experimenter. Indeed, any such linkage appears in his or her
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view as a distortion of experimental method. If the experimenter is to
remain an external observer of the consequences of his or her actions, he
or she must be, in Geoffrey Vicker’s phrase, a spectator-manipulator.
Just as laws are taken to be in the situation-waiting as it were, to be
discovered-so are the things and relations to which laws refer, for
example, &dquo;teachers,&dquo; &dquo;students,&dquo; &dquo;teaching methods,&dquo; and &dquo;reading
scores.&dquo; Campbell’s view of social experimentation rests on the assump-
tion that the things and relations of an experimental situation are given.
The problem is not to discover the variables but to find out how they are
causally connected to one another. The task of experimental design
begins when the description of the situation and the problem of inter-
vention are already given. True and quasi-experimental methods aim at
objective knowledge of the lawful patterns of variables taken to be
inherent in social phenomena.
The Study of Community-Level Nutrition Interventions
Over the past four years, we have studied a large number of
community-level projects aimed at reducing malnourishment, mainly
among children between the ages of zero and six, in a variety of develop-
ing countries. In order to explore what could be learned from these
projects, we considered them as intervention experiments.
Using conventional measures of malnourishment, we first tried to
determine whether in the course of each project a change in the nutri-
tional status of the target population had occurred, and if so, whether it
could be validly attributed to project intervention. We posed plausible
alternate explanations of the change and devised patching-up experi-
ments to discriminate between the intervention-hypothesis and its
rivals. In short, we tried to apply to our sample a method of experimen-
tal inquiry very much along the lines of Campbell’s quasi-experiment.
What we learned has a direct bearing on the applicability of Campbell’s
particular formulation and on the more general questions of efficacy,
validity, and rigor.
We selected our sample by scanning the published literature, project
reports, and lists of projects funded by agencies concerned with the
problem of malnourishment in the developing world. Initially, we
searched for projects at the village- or regional-level, which included as
an objective the reduction in malnourishment among children below
primary school age. We found about 25 projects of this type for which
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there existed documentation sufficient for analysis of some kind; and of
these, only 8 met minimal criteria for evaluation as intervention experi-
ments. The availability of time-series measurements of nutritional status
was the most decisive of our selection criteria.
This is the sample of projects we finally selected for analysis:
(1) Candelaria-A program featuring home visits by volunteer &dquo;barefoot
doctors&dquo; in the town of Candelaria, Columbia. Services include education
on nutrition, hygiene, and the utilization of health services; weighing of
children; and referrals to the medical establishment.
(2) Candelaria Revisited-A resurvey of the village of Candelaria two years
after termination of the program.
(3) Primops-An extension of the Candelaria concept to an urban setting in
Cali, Columbia.
(4) Esperanca-A program based on the establishment of health posts in
rural villages in the Central Amazon region of Brazil. Services included
the provision of basic health care by a visiting doctor and/ or a locally
trained &dquo;barefoot doctor&dquo;, nutrition and health education, and child
weighing.
(5) SCR-Honduras-A program following the Save the Children community
development scheme, CBIRD, carried out in the Pespire region of
Honduras. Food supplements were administered in parallel with more
general development efforts.
(6) SCF-Indonesia-Another Save the Children program, this time in the
special province of Aceh in northern Sumatra.
(7) Thailand-An experiment to test the effect of rice fortification on
nutrition and health in the Chaing Mai region of Thailand.
(8) Kottar-A community development oriented program run by the Kottar
Social Services Society in Tamil Nadu, India. Services include food
supplementation, nutrition, and health education, immunizations, and
more general community development assistance.
Later on in the project, we considered a few other similar projects
reported in the published literature. For our main sample of eight
projects, however, we relied on primary data in the form of protocols or
IBM punch cards and we carried out independent field evaluations.
We should note that, although we tried to analyze all of these projects
as experiments, the project leaders gave different weightings to the
importance of experimental design and control. In only one case (Thai-
land) did the project leader conceive of his activity primarily as a
hypothesis-testing experiment. In all other cases, although there was a
strong interest in learning from project experience, the primary interest
of the project staff was to improve children’s nutritional status.
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The main results of our analysis:
(1) In only two of the eight projects could we establish with reliability
that the target population had experienced a positive change in nutri-
tional status. In all other cases, our efforts to infer such a change were
blocked by confusing, unreliable, or meaningless data, by inadequate
measures or measurement methods, or by confounding changes in the
composition of the target group.
(2) In no case could we make an unambiguous, internally valid
attribution of change in nutritional status to the project’s intervention.
On the basis of available data, our supplementary research was insuffi-
cient to rule out some plausible alternate explanation of the change.
(3) The extent to which project staff had tried to achieve the condi-
tions of rigorous experimental design seemed to make no difference to
the interpretability of their results. The more rigorously designed proj-
ects produced data as indeterminate as the data produced by the most
&dquo;informal&dquo; ones.
Thus, as Campbell might have predicted, we found it impossible to
treat community-level interventions as &dquo;true experiments.&dquo; We found,
to a greater extent than his writings suggest (but perhaps not surpris-
ingly, in view of the settings of our projects), that &dquo;dirty data&dquo; and
inadequate measures were a major obstacle to the interpretation of
experimental results. Also, we found in the more rigorous as in the less
rigorous designs that the patching-up methods of quasi-experiments
were in some cases able to rule out some plausible rival hypotheses but in
no case sufficient to permit an unambiguous interpretation of the data.
These findings raise a critically important question about the extent
to which the experiments produce indeterminate results because the
experimenters failed to conform to the canons of quasi-experimental
rigor. Would it have been possible to learn more from the experiments
had the researchers been less sloppy, or was the indeterminacy of
experimental results inherent in the intervention situations themselves?
Clearly, some obstacles to the interpretation of experimental results
could have been eliminated by tighter research practices. Some inade-
quate measures could have been improved, some dirty data could have
been cleaned (although even here, as we will see, improving the quality
of data requires a very different relationship between researcher and
practitioner than the one advocated by Campbell). But these improve-
ments in research practices would not have eliminated certain funda-
mental obstacles to interpretation. Indeed, more &dquo;rigorous&dquo; experimen-
tation would have introduced new sources of indeterminacy.
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Thus, the thrust of our argument is not to urge that community-level
nutrition interventions conform more rigorously to the model of quasi-
experimental models. Rather, we shall question the model’s appropri-
ateness and propose an alternative to it.
Let us consider, to begin with, the phenomena of &dquo;dirty data&dquo; and
&dquo;inadequate measures.&dquo;
Dirty data. All of our projects were plagued by faulty practices in the
collection, storage, and processing of data. As a result, project findings
were inconsistent, confusing, or uninterpretable. In the most egregious
case, a tropical bug ate machine-readable holes in the computer cards
used for data storage! While this was a rare event, there were other less
exotic problems in the design of formats for data collection, the reliabil-
ity and consistency of reports, the use of numerical scales and standards,
and the interpretation of subject’s reports.
Often, we found that it was possible to detect and correct errors in a
data set long after the data had been collected. By testing the range
assumed by relevant variables and examining their internal consistency
within and between observation periods in a longitudinal sequence, we
were able to eliminate many mechanical errors without loss of valuable
information.
In the Primops projects, for example, the time series observations on
each individual were linked by a single identification number. The age of
each child at each observation was recorded, as was the date of the
observation. By comparing the change in age between successive obser-
vations with the calendar time between those observations, we were able
to identify cases where two observations for a single identification
number could not possibly describe a single individual. Some of these
errors could be corrected (long after the fact) in Michigan by careful
scrutiny of the data. For example, when more than two observations
appeared for a single child, the age for the one erroneous entry would be
set to conform to the sequence created by the other, apparently correct,
entries. However, without returning to Cali, Columbia, and visiting the
children, many of these errors could not be corrected.
In general, we found, the greater the distance between the collectors
and the users of data, and the longer the time interval between collection
and use, the dirtier the data and the more difficult it was to detect and
correct errors. Indeed, when practitioners and participants felt discon-
nected from the researchers and their purpose (as required by the
principle of &dquo;experimental distance&dquo;), they tend to give short shrift to the
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task of data collection. When the promotoras could see no immediate,
practical utility for the data they were asked to collect, for example, they
tended to regard data collection as a meaningless diversion from the task
of health service or food distribution, whose utility they could
understand.
Inadequate measures. Normal methods for assessing the nutritional
status of chidren use anthropometric measurements of height and
weight. Typically, the height or weight of a preschool child is compared
to a standard height or weight derived from observations of healthy
children of the same age as that child. Alternatively, the weight of the
child may be compared to the weight of healthy children of the same
height as that child. A deficiency in either of these scores is taken as an
index of malnourishment.
In the field application of these apparently simple methods, we found
six sources of error that interfered significantly with our efforts to
estimate change in the nutritional status of a population of children over
time.
( 1) Where measures of health do not coincide with measures of size, a
child may be misclassified as malnourished. It has been shown, for
example, that no child who suffered from chronic malnourishment,
especially during the age periods of human growth, is incapable of the
catch-up growth necessary to regain normalcy as defined by a growth
standard derived from healthy children. Some researchers have claimed,
in addition, that improved nutritional intake may contribute to increased
metabolism or level of activity rather than to growth.
(2) Whether a child is classified as malnourished may vary with the
selection of anthropometric standard. International standards derived
from healthy children in developed countries often prescribe more rapid
growth than the locally generated standards of a developing country. In
our Kottar analysis, for example, we showed, using a local standard,
that the percentage of children suffering from second or third degree
malnourishment dropped over a two and one-half year period from 50%
to 42.5%. When we switched to an international, sex-differentiated
standard, we showed a smaller decline, from 50.4% to 45.5%.
(3) Similarly, the picture of change in nutritional status can vary with
the choice of a cut-off-point for defining malnourishment. Because the
nutritional scores of a population tend to cluster around traditionally
accepted cutoff-points, small shifts in those points cause rather large
numbers of children to cross the boundaries between categories of
malnourishment.
(4) There is a debate over the definition of &dquo;improved nutritional
status in a community.&dquo; Some analysts use mean percentage of stan-
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dard, while others emphasize the need to show the greatest improvement
among those initially worst off. Often, the selection of a statistical
method is tantamount to a definition of &dquo;improvement&dquo; and, in these
cases, the choice of statistical method governs the description of change
in nutritional status.
(5) Depending on the selection of the variables used to monitor
change in nutritional status, estimates of change may vary. Weight for
age, height for age, and weight for height-the most common anthro-
pometric ratios-measure different aspects of malnourishment. The last
measures acute malnourishment; the second, chronic undernourish-
ment ; and the first, a composite of the two. Because height is the
numerator of one score and the denominator of the other, it is possible
and not surprising that instances exist whereas height-for-age scores
increase, weight-for-age scores decrease, and vice-versa.
(6) Finally, estimates of change in nutritional status are distorted by
the usual method of accounting for the relationship between malnour-
ishment and life cycle. The typical child in the developing world expe-
riences a gradual deterioration of nutritional status from birth to some
age of &dquo;maximum&dquo; risk (usually between 18 and 24 months) and then
improves. Because participating children grow older in the course of an
experiment, analysis must take account of the typical pattern of growth.
We have recommended mapping changes in nutritional status by the use
of a &dquo;characteristic curve&dquo;-a graph of malnourishment against age in a
population at a single point in time (Drake et al., 1980: 97). However,
even with a characteristic curve, the picture of change can be altered by
redefining age categories or selection of different cutoff-points or
standards.
The use of anthropometric measures of malnourishment is likely to
remain troublesome. The development of other methods (blood serum
tests, for example) may eventually supplant anthropometrics, although,
at present, most nutrition intervention projects cannot bear their addi-
tional costs. If it were possible, through field research, to learn more
about the response of each type of anthropometric score to &dquo;prove&dquo;
interventions, it might also be possible to set precedents for the use of
these scores to assess changes in nutritional status in the field. For
reasons that we shall shortly explain, we are unlikely to be able to
establish &dquo;proven interventions&dquo; of this kind. Nevertheless, it is clear
that some obstacles to the valid detection of change in nutritional status
may be eliminated through the use of better measures and measurement
methods, just as some (but not all) dirty data may be eliminated through
the postexperimental application of better methods of data cleaning.
Even when a positive change in nutritional status has been detected,
however, there remains the task of explaining it. Usually, such changes
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are ambiguous, in the sense they they are plausibly attributable to
factors other then the experimental intervention. Conversely, an actual
effect of intervention may be masked by other changes in the environ-
ment. In order to tell, therefore, whether indeterminate experiments
might be clarified by a more rigorous application of quasi-experimental
methods, we must explore the sources of ambiguity.
Ambiguous data. We found several sources of ambiguous data: the
changing make-up of the population under study, concurrent changes in
the project’s environment, and the participants’ or practitioners’ aware-
ness of the experimental process.
In every one of our data sets, there was evidence of change in the
composition of experimental or control groups. In Primops, for exam-
ple, there was a marked tendency for children to disappear from the data
set from one round of data collection to the next. Very likely, their
&dquo;disappearance&dquo; was due to some combination of in- or outmigration,
intrabarrio movement, death, defection from the sample, or recording
error. What was striking, however, was that in each round more of the
malnourished disappeared than did the wellnourished. The appearance
of improvement in nutritional status from round to round may well have
been due to this selective disappearance. Such changes in composition
of the sample are unavoidable so long as it is impossible to isolate the
experimental group from ordinary patterns of population movement.
We encountered several kinds of experiment-confounding changes in
the project environment. Changes in climate were important. In Esper-
anca, for example, time-series observations of matched pairs of experi-
mental and control villages showed a greater change in nutritional status
associated with experimental treatment. But because parts of the base-
line survey were administered in different seasons at six-month intervals
while the resurvey was done in a single season, the observed difference
may have reflected ordinary seasonal shifts in nutritional status. In
Kottar, we could not distinguish the effects of intervention from the
impact of the easing of a highly localized drought.
Changes in economic climate were also important. Inflation or
depression (or recovery from them) may affect nutritional status, per-
haps in combination with changes in local economy. In Thailand, the
rice fortification experiment was seriously hindered for a time when the
rising black market for rice, across the Laotian border, led to illicit
export of the product intended for local consumption.
Changes in the infrastructure, or in the availability of other services,
may overlap the effects of intervention. It was not possible, for example,
to distinguish the effects of teaching the promotoras in Candelaria
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Revisited from earlier improvements in water and sewage disposal
systems. Changes in social norms and structures may also affect nutri-
tional status. In Kottar, project leaders saw their nutritional interven-
tions as incentives for community organization. There, we could not
validly attribute change in nutritional status to supplementary feeding
or nutritional education alone, because participating families were also
learning at the same time to make better use of other resources, includ-
ing their own labor.
Changes in nutritional status may result from the practitioners’
awareness of the experimental process. In Honduras, for example, nine
months into the feeding component of the intervention, a medical
consultant who had been monitoring the data urged that food be tar-
geted to the moderately malnourished. In his opinion, the most seriously
malnourished, who suffered from diseases beyond food deficiency,
would derive less benefit from the food. But the net result of his policy
was a spurious improvement in aggregate scores of nutritional status.
We were able to reduce some of the ambiguity of our experimental
results by quasi-experimental patching up. In our analysis of the Kottar
data, for example, we were able to rule out the hypothesis that change in
nutritional status reflected a bias in the selection of new participants
over time. Our supplementary research had only a limited impact on
ambiguity, however, because it occurred at the end of the experiment
when it was no longer possible to alter the data-gathering process.
Neither in Kottar nor in any other project could we rule out all plausible
rival hypotheses.
A deeper consideration of our sample suggests, moreover, that even if
patching experiments had been initiated in the midst of the projects,
some indeterminacy of experimental results would still remain. The
situations of community-level nutrition intervention are in certain cru-
cial respects inconsistent with Campbell’s fundamental assumptions
about the lawfulness and the objective knowability of social reality.
These situations are inherently vulnerable to unpredictable instability
and, therefore, to real uncertainty. They are often unique; general
principles derived from them cannot be validly applied to other cases.
And because some of them are understandable only in terms of the
experimenters’ transactions with them, they are better regarded as holis-
tic transformation than as experimental manipulations of discrete
variables.
We will consider each of these features in turn.
Uncertainty. Campbell calls attention to the fact that the contexts of
experiments may be unstable, changing in ways that confound experi-
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mental designs.4 In our sample of intervention experiments, we found
many examples of instability. Over the long time periods of interven-
tion, contexts tend to change out from under the experimental design.
Often, moreover, the changing variables that confound experiments are
ones the experimenters have not thought to name or include in their
design. The context of experiment is unpredictably unstable. We have
already mentioned the effects of the black market for rice on the care-
fully designed rice fortification experiment in Thailand. In Indonesia, to
take another example, the staff of the Save the Children Foundation
reported a major flood, an outbreak of cholera, and military uprising,
all of which disrupted the flow of services to the target population. Such
an unpredicted, unnamed instability of context not only confounds the
experimenter’s design but causes him, at least for a time, to be unable to
make sense of the situation. It is this phenomenon that we will call
&dquo;uncertainty. &dquo;
When a situation become uncertain in this sense, its initial description
becomes problematic. It is not only that the experiment is confounded
by an unexpected change in the environment (although this is true) but
that the experimenter no longer feels confident that he or she knows the
names of the variables to be manipulated or observed. The experimenter
is confronted not with a &dquo;problem&dquo; (for which the suggested intervention
hypothesis may be a solution) but with a problematic situation. He or
she cannot revise the experiment until the situation has been redescribed
and the problem under investigation has been reframed. From the point
of view of the validity of experimental inference, what this means is that
an intervention hypothesis that seemed internally valid at one time may
become internally invalid at a subsequent time, not because an impor-
tant variable has been neglected, but because the whole situation has
changed.
The situations of community-level intervention are inherently
vulnerable to an unpredictable instability (and the experimenter is
vulnerable to real uncertainty) because they have to do with human
beings in interaction with one another. The patterns of the situation, and
of the larger environment in which it is embedded, are dependent on
what Philip Herbst has called &dquo;behavioral worlds.&dquo; If social contexts
manifest patterns of relatively long-term stability, Herbst points out, it
is because indiviudals create and maintain their stability.
A necessary condition for stable behavioral relationships to manifest
themselves is that parametric steady-state conditions are firmly estab-
lished and maintained. Ideal conditions of this type can be found under
everyday conditions where persons have built up a stable cognitive and
19
behavioral structure.... We know that if a person starts a new job or
becomes a member of a new organization it generally takes weeks and
often months before these conditions are achieved [Herbst, 1970: 52].5
In the social context of a community in a developing country, for
example, a new practice, such as the consumption of soya or the pro-
longed breast-feeding of infants, may take on the characteristics of a
stable pattern of behavior, if the inhabitants of the behavioral world of
the community choose to make it do so. In spite of the potentially
destabilizing effects of events beyond their control, the members of a
community may choose to maintain a stable pattern of behavior-
depending always on the meanings they construct for these events.
No event has intrinsic characteristics of stress, strain, output, etc. but
events acquire these characteristics in so far as a behavior structure of
mutually dependent elements is evolved which operates so as to maintain
its survival [Herbst, 1970: 52].
On the other hand, when meanings change, along with patterns of
thinking, feeling and deciding, the stable &dquo;laws&dquo; of social phenomena
may suddenly destabilize.
A behavior system will cease to function if its organizational structure is
dissolved or destroyed, the systems boundaries no longer operate, and no
output is produced which is needed to maintain the essential transactional
process with the environment [Herbst, 1970: 53].
The uncertainty characteristic of the contexts of nutrition intervention
experiments in developing countries is an indication that the &dquo;lawful-
ness&dquo; of social phenomena is very different from the lawfulness of
phenomena studied in the natural sciences. The former is an artifact of
behavioral worlds, self-created by their inhabitants, and maintained-
to the extent that it is maintained-by their patterns of thinking, feeling,
and deciding.
Uniqueness. In our study of community-level nutrition interventions,
we found, as Herbst had found in his longitudianl studies of work
groups, that behavioral worlds may vary significantly from case to case,
or even in the same case from an earlier world to a later time.
Candelaria has been shaped by twenty years of intense interaction
with teams of professionals from a nearby medical school. In the village
of Villa Rica, Colombia, where the mostly black inhabitants earn a
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meager living by working as hired hands on local plantations, there is a
geographic split between residents of higher and lower status that affects
every attempt at intervention. In Buenos Aires, a mountain village not
far away, the social patterns of family and community life changed
radically in mid-experiment in response to the start of construction
work on a dam.
We agree with Herbst that the potential for uniqueness is inherent in
the character of behavioral worlds:
The basic difference between non-living matter and living beings is that
the former is subject to laws whereas the latter create the laws that
determine their behavior. Every person as a result of his aim-directed
behavior builds a behavioral universe and the laws in terms of which it
operates [Herbst, 1970: 53].
Because individuals build the worlds in which they live, and groups of
individuals build community worlds, it is understandable that their
patterns of stability may vary from case to case. For any given interven-
tion hypothesis that purports to describe a general pattern of reactions
to intervention there is good reason to expect the next situation to be, in
some important way, an exception.
It does not follow from this that social contexts of intervention that
are unique in some respects must be unique in all respects. The people
who participate in nutrition experiments have a physiological as well as
a social dimension. The categories of anthropometric measurement of
human beings, or nutritional contents of foods, may be validly general-
izable across social contexts, even when the social meanings of mea-
surement or food are found to vary from one context to another. As we
will explore more fully later on, nutrition intervention experiments may
lend themselves to a combination of experimental methods, some of
which are adapted to the uniqueness of behavioral worlds and others, to
the replicable categories of nutrition science.
What does not follow from the uniqueness of behavioral worlds,
however, is that we cannot, with any confidence, claim to generalize to
&dquo;like situations&dquo; an intervention hypothesis inferred from a particular
set of experimental results.
Transaction. The methods of true and quasi-experiment depend on a
view of the experimenter as one who manipulates a few variables in order
to observe the effects of his manipulation on other variables. According
to this view, the experimenter stands outside the experimental situation.
Any change the experimenter induces in the situation, apart from his or
her intended manipulations, counts as a distortion-an effect of &dquo;test-
ing&dquo; or &dquo;reactivity.&dquo;
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We have observed, on the contrary, that the interventions in our
sample always produced changes in the situation beyond the intended
experimental treatment. In Honduras, for example, a supplementary
feeding program attracted an influx of new families whose demands
overwhelmed the project’s limited resources. In the more apparently
successful of our cases, moreover, the specifically nutritional compo-
nent of the intervention was a small part of a broad-guaged transforma-
tion of the behaivoral world of the community. In Candelaria, health
professionals flooded the residents with services, with wide-ranging
effects on the patterns of family life. In Kottar, the project leaders
undertook a regional program of community organization that built up
a network of local cooperatives and effected widespread changes in
attitudes toward regional government. It might be argued, indeed, that
these interventions were successful because they changed the nature of
whole communities. Certainly, in both cases, the experimenters’ ability
to collect reasonably accurate time-series measurements of the nutri-
tional status of children depended on their success in instituting a new
pattern of regular child visits to health clinits-a radical change in an
important aspect of family life.
As a result of these holistic changes, neither Candelaria nor Kottar
was, by the end of the experiment, the &dquo;same community&dquo; that it had
been at the beginning. Such changes are not properly described by an
intervention hypothesis of the form, &dquo;in situation S, intervention X
produces a difference, D, between pre- and postintervention observa-
tions.&dquo; Postintervention, &dquo;S&dquo; is no longer &dquo;S&dquo; but &dquo;S’ &dquo;. We would do
better to say that the experiment had transformed the situation into one
that manifested the pattern subsequently observed. In such cases, the
intervenor does not &dquo;confirm an intervention hypothesis&dquo;; rather, his or
her ability to effect a presumably desirable transformation is revealed.
Similarly, the intervenors were significantly changed by their inter-
ventions. They became deeply involved in community life, entered into
close relationships with local practitioners and participants, and-in at
least one case-underwent a radicalizing change of view that led them to
recast the problem of malnourishment as a problem of political and
economic organization. If we wished to be faithful to the experience of
both the experimenters and the participants, we would have to place the
intervenors in the situation they were trying to understand and change.
As Geoffrey Vickers has put it, they were not &dquo;speculator/ manipula-
tors&dquo; but &dquo;agents experient.&dquo; They engaged in a transaction with the
situation in the course of which both they and the situation as a whole
were transformed in ways both intended and unintended.
From the point of view of the validity of true or quasi-experimental
inference, we would have to say that these sorts of interventions-our
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most likely candidates for &dquo;success&dquo;-were not experiments at all. There
was no manipulation of a few variables, holding the rest of the situation
constant. Rather, we should say that the intervenor framed the problem
of the situation in question found in the community, constructed an
image of a desirable future for that community, and then embarked on a
broad-guaged strategy of intervention through which he or she tried to
make that vision come true. The resulting transformation is, inevitably,
bound up with the person or persons who undertook the intervention.
The uniqueness of the changing situation is, at least in part, of the
intervenor’s own making.
In summary, then, we have attempted to apply quasi-experimental
methods to a sample of community-level nutrition interventions, having
chosen from a verly large sample those that seemed most amenable to
being treated as experiments. For the most part, we found the results of
the experiment indeterminate. In only two cases were we able to ascer-
tain that a positive change in nutritional status had occurred and, even
in these, we could not attribute the change unambiguously to the
intervention.
The sources of indeterminacy were mixed. In some cases, the difficul-
ties of interpreting data were attributable to sloppy practices. We found
that some dirty data could be made interpretable postexperiment, and
that some methods of measuring nutritional status could be improved.
We also found it possible, by supplementary research undertaken after
the experiment, to eliminate some plausible accounts of observed
changes. But we found residual dirty data, measurement error, and
ambiguity of results, which we could not eliminate by any of these
after-the-fact methods.
More fundamentally, we found that certain inherent features of our
intervention situations are inconsistent with the philosophical assump-
tions on which quasi-experimental method depends:
(1) Our situations are vulnerable to unpredictable instabilities which
not only confound the experiment but bring the experimenter into a
state of real uncertainty. Under these circumstances, the ontology of the
situation becomes problematic. The inquirer cannot continue to apply
quasi-experimental methods until he has redescribed the situation and
reframed the problem he is trying to solve. These tasks cannot be
undertaken via quasi-experimental method; they are necessary condi-
tions for the further application of the method.
The potential for instability is inherent in the behavioral worlds of the
situation and its larger social environment. The stable patterns of behav-
ior that sometime characterize behavioral worlds are dependent on the
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thinking, feeling, and choosing of the individuals who create and main-
tain those patterns; and they may destabilize when individuals come to
think, feel, and choose differently.
(2) Intervention situations are often unique. Behavioral worlds vary
significantly from time to time and from case to case. If the &dquo;next case&dquo; is
likely to be significantly different from any given intervention experi-
ment, then we cannot assume the lawfulness of social reality on which
external validity depends.
(3) Researchers, practitioners, and participants create for themselves
a behavioral world whose properties affect the results of experiment.
The principle of experimental distance, which demands that practition-
ers and participants remain apart from and ignorant of the goals of the
experiment, contributes to the production of fragmentary and errone-
ous data.
(4) In many intervention situations, and especially in the ones where a
positive change in nutritional status is detectable, the intervenor produ-
ces a holistic transformation. It is not appropriate here to say that a
change in an experimental variable has made a difference in a dependent
variable. The whole situation has changed through the interventor’s
interaction with it.
Possible Responses to Our Findings
If findings such as these are accepted (and some of them, at least, are
familiar to other workers in the domain of malnourishment), several
responses are possible.
Some researchers, wedded to the ideal of true experiment and
plagued with difficulties in their attempts to use quasi-experimental
methods, have called for still more stringent efforts at randomization of
experimental and control groups, with a correlated increase in the
complexity of experimental design:
Therefore, any experimental design which does not randomly distribute
the intervention and its controls within a village or region must have
sufficient villages or regions covered by each treatment (replicates) so that
one can estimate the probable contribution of non-specific influences at
the village or regional level. Adjacent villages and regions must have
different treatments, and the villages and regions should be so stratified
that any other random non-specific influences are controlled for. Designs
which show differences between required replicates must remain suspect
[Habicht and Butz, 1979: 150].
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But, given our findings, such efforts are doomed to failure. If anything,
they would increase our dependency on principles of predesign, con-
stancy, and distance that are impossible to maintain under the real-
world conditions of community-level intervention. It is no accident that
the most rigorous designs in our sample produced results as ambiguous
as the most informal.
Indeed, a more stringent attempt at rigorous experimental control is
likely to reduce the reliability of interpretation. To the extent that
researchers try to kep subjects and practitioners from knowing about
the experiment, in order to avoid the effects of reactivity or instrumenta-
tion, they create a pattern of deception that erodes the trust essential
both to effective delivery of the intervention and to reliable data collec-
tion. If they try to exercise strict control over the distribution of treat-
ments perceived as scarce goods, they tend to foster competition, envy,
and hostility and, what is more, they engage in practices of dubious
morality. If they try to enforce experimental controls by the use of
coercive methods, their findings are likely to reflect the unintended
consequences of their coercion.
Such conclusions might lead to a second response: Practitioners of
nutrition interventions in the developing world should give up their
hopes for learning based on rigorous experiment.
There is a third response. If we have been unable to implement the
models of true or quasi-experiments, perhaps we should reconsider their
appropriateness to the conditions of nutrition intervention in the devel-
oping world. Perhaps we must adopt a view of experimental efficacy,
validity, and rigor better suited to the unpredictable instability, the
uniqueness, the transactional properties and the dependence on local
practitioners and participants, which we have found to be characteristic
of our sample of community-level interventions.
In the following section, we shall outline such an alternative model of
experimental inquiry. It differs from Campbell’s quasi-experimental
method in that it is not a proposal to &dquo;soften&dquo; or dirty the clean, hard
method of natural science experimentation. Rather, it is a proposal to
rethink the meaning of a good intervention experiment and the kind of
knowledge we can get from it.
Reflection-in-A ction
When we consider a community-level nutrition intervention as
reflection-in-action, we consider it as a process of iterative experimenta-
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tion, undertaken on the spot. The inquirer begins with an initial descrip-
tion of the community situation and an initial framing of the problem he
is trying to solve. On the basis of these, he or she designs an initial
strategy of intervention and begins to carry it out. The design will
include a data gathering system, the terms of which will monitor,
on-line, the consequences of his or her actions. Data are rapidly cap-
tured and fed back to the inquirer for interpretation. As they are
interpreted, he or she becomes aware of consequences that may be
expected or unexpected, desirable or undesirable. More narrowly, this
information may be used to detect and correct faulty data gathering
procedures, to identify ambiguities in the data, and make mid-course
corrections in experimental design or redesign strategies of intervention.
More broadly, as new features of the situation become apparent-some
of which may be induced by his intervention-the intervenor may
reframe the problem of the situation. The iterative process of describing,
reframing, and redesigning may continue throughout the life of the
intervention. Let us begin with the narrower view of reflection-in-action
and then go on to the broader one.
As we have already seen, sloppy or inconsistent data gathering
procedures may produce spurious changes in indices of nutritional
status. When fieldworkers fail to &dquo;zero&dquo; a scale properly, for example,
they may produce a consistent overstatement of children’s weights. Or
when weight-for-height is used as an index of malnourishment, a .3
kilogram overestimate may cause 15% of a group of malnourished
children to appear normal. In Primops, the percentage of observations
falling outside the predefined range increased steadily with each new
batch of data from a low of 6.9% to a high of 24.1 %-a change attribu-
table, we believe, to the promotoras’decreasing interest in data gather-
ing. In Kottar, we found obvious key-punching errors in 40% of the
anthropometric data. The method of reflection-in-action has a twofold
effect on these sources of error. Because it brings data analysis into the
field at frequent intervals in the course of experiment, it permits the
detection and correction of procedural mistakes before they produce an
irreversible impact on the quality of data. Further, because it involves
local practitioners in data analysis and redesign of experiment, it
exposes them to the uses of the data and the disruptions produced by
errors. Practitioners may then become highly motivated to improve
their procedures. In Honduras, for example, a quick and dirty analysis
of data on nutritional status, undertaken in the field in the early stages of
the project, led to a wholesale revamping of the data gathering system.
Reflection-in-action cannot prevent changes in the composition of
experimental or control groups that give rise to spurious analytic
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results, but it can give researchers a chance to become aware of these
changes while it is still possible to ascertain their magnitude and explore
the reasons for them. As local practitioners learn to shift their emphasis
from service delivery to experimentation in effective reduction of
malnourishment through service delivery, they are likely to become
more interested in tracking the original sample of participants, charting
their progress, and understanding the causes of their defection. They
may learn to see changes in the sample, which might otherwise confuse
estimates of progress, as occasions for redesign and retesting of
interventions. When researchers work closely in this way with prac-
titioners and participants, they choose to accept and deal with the risks
of Hawthorne effects in order to avoid the costs of experimental
distance. Similarly, reflection-in-action offers advantages over quasi-
experimental method in its treatment of ambiguous data. For one thing,
practitioners and participants are closer to the project environment than
are researchers and, as a result, they are more likely to identify changes
in environment and behavior that affect nutritional status. Hence, they
are often better equipped to generate plausible rivals to the intervention
hypothesis. In the Honduras food supplement experiment, for example,
local practitioners made the researchers aware that an apparent
improvement in nutritional status might be due to a new screening
policy, instituted by a medical adviser, that allowed only malnourished
children to enter the sample. Second, because reflection-in-action
encourages the early discovery of ambiguous data, it permits experi-
menters to carry out on-the-spot experiments that generate new data in
the field while the intervention is still underway. In Kottar, for example,
had inquirers been aware of the problem of distinguishing the effects of
intervention from the effects of recovery from drought, they might have
used a strategy of differentiated environment. In mid-experiment, they
could have divided the group receiving experimental treatment into
subregions of high and low drought. In Primops, where we learned after
the fact that it was impossible to distinguish the effects of improved
sewage disposal from the effects of the promotoras’teaching, it might
have been possible in the course of experiment to employ a strategy of
differentiated treatment. Of two groups of children subject to the
benefits of improved sewage disposal, only one would be selected to
receive the intervention.
Of course, these strategies of on-the-spot experiments would have
their limits. In the effort to differentiate environment, experimenters
might introduce new sources of variation; children in a low drought
region might turn out, for example, to be surrounded by a richer supply
of foods. In the effort to differentiate treatment, experimenters might
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select a treatment group that differs in several ways from the control
group. In the first case, one might further differentiate the sample by
distinguishing in the low drought region between poor and less poor
families. In the second, one might randomize the selection of the
treatment and control groups. In the field, however, there are limits to
the number of groups that can be set up and observed. Repeated
differentiation of the sample may produce cell sizes too small for
significant analysis, and the establishment of control groups may be
politically or morally unacceptable.
In situations like these, qualitative description may help to dis-
criminate between an intervention-hypothesis and its rivals. A richer
description of the context and process of intervention may provide
evidence in favor of one of the contending hypotheses. Recovery from
drought might be reflected, for example, in an observable change in the
variety and quantity of foods available to the families. Or, where the
problem is one of distinguishing the effects of education in nutrition and
hygiene from the effects of improvement in the economy, experimenters
might observe changing patterns of diet, hygiene, and infant diarrheas at
the family level. Here, too, however, supplementary research may
uncover new sources of ambiguity. A better description of the inter-
mediate effects of intervention may suggest new rival hypotheses to
account for an observed change in nutritional status.
Because the several strategies of on-the-spot experiment may fail to
discriminate among plausible hypotheses, and may even multiply
sources of ambiguity, it is reasonable to ask when it is legitimate to bring
hypothesis testing to a close. How much discrimination among
hypotheses is enough? This question calls for a reexamination of the
functions of experimentation.
We recognize three such functions. In the first, exploratory experi-
mentation, we probe something to see how it will respond. In the second,
intervention-testing experiment, we experiment to test the efficacy of an
action: When we act in a certain way, do we get what we intend, or like
what we get? In the third, hypothesis-testing experiment, we try to
confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis by testing whether the consequences
of action deduced from the hypothesis occur. An exploratory experi-
ment succeeds when it leads to the discovery of something new. An
intervention-testing experiment succeeds (or is &dquo;affirmed,&dquo; as we shall
say) when the inquirer likes what he or she gets from it, taking its
intended and unintended consequences as a whole. A hypothesis-testing
experiment succeeds when it discriminates among rival hypotheses.
Understandably, given his natural science view of social experi-
mentation, Campbell focuses only on hypothesis testing. When inter-
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vention experiments are considered from the perspective of reflection-
in-action, however, they are seen to combine the three functions. The
hypothesis-testing experiment is also an intervention by which the
inquirer tries to change the situation for the better and as a probe with
which he or she hopes to discover new phenomena. In reflection-in-
action, therefore, we evaluate an intervention experiment on the basis of
three criteria: Has the intervention been confirmed? Has it led to the
discovery of something new? Has it discriminated among competing
hypotheses? The three criteria are logically distinct. An intervention
may reveal new phenomena or may be affirmed, even when it fails to
produce its intended consequences. Conversely, an intervention may
succeed in discrimination among rival hypotheses while producing an
undesirable change in the situation. Under these circumstances, the
inquirer’s evaluation should reflect the relative importance he or she
attaches to the various interests in the experiment. Is the inquirer more
interested in changing the situation, in understanding the causes of its
change, or in discovering something new about it?
Suppose, for example, that a supplementary feeding intervention
yields no observable change in a community’s rate of malnourishment.
The intervenors may then discard their initial intervention hypothesis in
favor of a new one: Perhaps, even with supplementary feeding, patterns
of food sharing and substitution leave the level of consumption of
nutrients unchanged. If new observations are inconsistent with this
hypothesis, the intervenors may look to parasites in the community’s
drinking water. If they find parasites in the water, clean water may
become the focus of a new intervention. If clean water coupled with
supplementary feeding yields an improvement in nutritional status, and
no further decline in the overall situation occurs, the intervenors may
bring the learning sequence to a close. Here, it is the logic of affirmation
that answers the question, How much discrimination among alternate
hypotheses is enough? The answer is, Enough to produce an inter-
vention that can be affirmed. Of course, if the intervenor thinks of the
present project as a preparation for future ones, he or she may continue
hypothesis-testing experimentation beyond this point, seeking to rule
out plausible rival accounts of his or her success or to pinpoint features
of the intervention that worked.
Thus, a reflection-in-action hypothesis-testing experiment is bound
by the inquirer’s appreciations. Initiated by the detection of something
troubling or promising, it is terminated by changes the inquirer finds on
the whole satisfactory-even when the store of rival hypotheses has not
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been exhausted-or by the discovery of new features that give the
situation a new meaning and change the questions to be asked.
Turning now to the broader meaning of reflection-in-action, we recall
that intervention experiments are always embedded in a particular way
of framing the problematic situation. Even when inquirers begin with a
common objective function (for example, &dquo;over a five-year period
reduce by 20% the rate of malnourishment in children between the ages
of zero to six&dquo;), they must still select things and relations in the situation
to which they will pay attention; and they must frame the situation in a
way that gives direction to inquiry. Often the problem framing is tacit.
The inquirer may become aware that the problem has been framed in a
particular way only when he or she is surprised by an unexplained and
unwanted turn of events. Then he or she may become aware of his
problem-setting, and may attempt to reframe the problem. This inquiry
takes the form of a frame-experiment.
Consider a case in which field researchers in a developing country
begin by framing the problem of infant malnourishment in terms of
nutrient deficiency. They invented a solution to this problem-a new
infant formula containing supplementary nutrients essential to infant
growth, which they planned to distribute through normal marketing
channels. Several years later, mothers in many developing countries
were found to believe that it was more fashionable or &dquo;modern&dquo; to feed
their infants the new formula than to breast-feed them. At the same
time, researchers found that the nutritional status of infants actually
declined. Not only did infants lose the immunizing benefits of mother’s
milk, but because of the poor quality of water used to prepare the
formula, they suffered from a higher rate of diarrheas. As a result,
researchers began to rethink the problem thay had been trying to solve.
Some of them reframed the problem as one of encouraging mothers to
shift back to earlier habits of breast-feeding; their solutions took the
form of education and public information campaigns. Others focused
attention of the multinational companies that manufactured and sold
infant formula. They framed the problem as one of profiteering and
misinformation, and their solution took the form of efforts at regulatory
control and political pressure.
In this case, an initial intervention produced new information that the
researchers interpreted as calling not for a new data-gathering system
and not only for a new intervention hypothesis, but for a new problem
setting. They focused on new things and relations in the situation
(mother’s attitudes toward breast-feeding, the amorality of multina-
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tional corporations) and they reorganized the directions of their inquiry.
They might then test their reframing of the problem against the follow-
ing criteria:
. Do their new descriptions correspond to the facts? For example,
have mothers actually shifted in large numbers from breast-feeding to
infant formula? Is the water used to prepare the formula really of low
quality? Has the rate of infant diarrheas really increased? Negative
answers to these questions would be inconsistent with the new problem
settings; affirmative ones would be consistent with them (but might also
be consistent with others).
~ Can researchers solve the new problems they have set? Can they, for
example, persuade large numbers of mothers to return to breast-
feeding ? If not, their reflection-in-action may lead, appropriately, to yet
a new problem setting.
. Does the new problem setting make a confusing and uncertain
situation coherent to the inquirers? Does it open up inquiry to new
directions of interventions?
The interpretation of a frame-experiment is always relative to an
inquirer’s appreciative system-that is, to the system of values and
norms that guided his or her evaluations.6 Hence, frame experiments
yield personal knowledge that may be objective in some senses but not in
others. &dquo;Objectivity&dquo; may mean &dquo;neutrality&dquo; (freedom from interpretive
bias), &dquo;interpersonal objectivity&dquo; (holding true for one person as well as
for another), or &dquo;independence of think-so&dquo; (grounded in evidence
beyond mere opinion). Practitioners of true and quasi-experimental
methods aim at neutral, interpersonally objective judgments; hence
their emphasis on experimental distance and their selective inattention
to their own problem settings. The practitioner of reflection-in-action
recognizes that differences in problem settings are only partly resolvable
through experiment and that differences of interpretation are only
partly resolvable by reference to facts. Hence, he or she tries to reflect on
the tacit appreciations that undelie his or her own interpretations and
problem settings; and in relationships with local practitioners and par-
ticipants, he or she does not try to eliminate Hawthorne effects but to
become aware of them by helping to create a behavioral world condu-
cive to the exchange of valid information.
We have already noticed, in Candelaria and Kottar, how the mothers’
regular visits to local health clinics and the systematic measurements of
children were inherently connected to the nutrition intervention. The
creation of a regularized, predictable behavioral world was as indispen-
sable to the effects of intervention as to the researchers’ ability to detect
those effects. In Kottar, the establishment of such a world was also very
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likely inseparable from the network of relationships built up by the two
principal figures. These Hawthorne effects could not be eliminated
without eliminating the essence of the intervention. In reflection-in-
action, inquirers would not try to reduce such efforts but to gain valid
knowledge of them. They would try to be explicit about the appreciative
systems underlying their judgments and the person-dependent features
of their interventions. Within such an explicit appreciative framework,
it is possible to make interpretations of think-so, but such judgments are
neither neutral nor interpersonally objective. In Kottar, the inquirers
might discover, independent of think-so, whether their interventions
produced a positive change in nutritional status, but they would neither
dissociate their interventions from their own persons nor their judgments
from their particular ways of framing and transforming community
situations.
The absence of interpersonal objectivity is not troublesome to
reflection-in-action because this method of experiment does not involve
a search for general propositions applicable to similar cases. Here, the
inquirer treats each episode of intervention as a unique case. Neverthe-
less, he or she aims at the reflective transfer of learning from one unique
episode of reflection-in-action to others. Rather like a good medical
clinician, he or she seeks to build up a usable repertoire of unique cases.
Once a case has entered into the inquirer’s repertoire, he or she may
be able to see a second unique case as the first, doing in the second as he
or she has done in the first; the first functioning as an exemplar for
inquiry into the second.’ The two cases are not subsumed under a
general proposition. When confronted with a new situation, the reper-
toire of cases derived from his or her own experience or from the
recorded experience of others can be scanned to see if the new situation
is similar to one or more of these. He or she need not, at this point, be
able to say &dquo;similar with respect to what.&dquo; But from understanding the
first case, a variation appropriate to the second can be constructed-an
initial understanding that functions as a starting point for a new round
of reflection-in-action.
The norms of inquiry for reflective transfer of learning are only
roughly similar to those of Campbell’s external validity. Three main
questions arise:
*What are the criteria of &dquo;fit&dquo; between an element of repertoire and a
new situation?
. What does it mean to carry out a process of reflective transfer
rigorously and well?
. What are the features of the understanding of a unique case that
make it suitable for reflection transfer?
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&dquo;Fit&dquo; cannot be reduced to effectiveness in improving nutritional
status. The question is whether a case lends itself, in a particular situa-
tion, to a variation that would make a good starting point for inquiry. It
would not do so if there were a gross dissimilarity between old and new
situations. It would be inappropriate to see a new community situation
as Candelaria, for example, if in the new situation the quality of water
and sewage treatment were already relatively good. Further criteria of
fit have to do with the inquirer’s ability to detect intimations of useful
similarities between old and new cases before he or she can articulate
them or put them to the test. There is a craft of nutrition intervention,
analogous to the craft of clinical medicine, that has to do with the
inquirer’s ability to form and test such judgments. It is important, for
example, that the inquirer be aware of problem framing in the earlier
case and attentive to differences of context in the two cases.
It is also important to notice that reflective transfer takes account of
the uniqueness of the behavioral worlds of intervention situations. But
there are also some dimensions of those situations-for example, those
related to the anthropometric measurements of nutritional status-
which lend themselves to the methods of true or quasi-experiment and
to generalized application from case to case. An inquirer who treats his
or her repertoire of cases only as a source of exemplars for the initial
understanding of new situations may, at the same time, apply the
method of characteristic curves to every situation encountered.
Finally, when we substitute reflective transfer for the schema of
generalization, we also change the way in which intervention experi-
ments lead to policy advice. In Campbell’s formulation, intervention
experiments aim at general policy recommendations. General policies
are thought to originate at a center from which they flow to a distributed
population. In reflection-in-action, practitioners are not implementers
of a centrally defined policy but researchers, policymakers, and imple-
menters of their own policies. The contexts of intervention are not
instances of a type of situation but unique situations that bear, at best, a
family resemblance to another. Reflection-in-action lends itself to
&dquo;inductive planning&dquo; where policy is made and implemented in a highly
distributed way, and practitioners learn from themselves and one
another. In such a distributed system, a policy center would not make
policy but would facilitate distributed learning by documentating, col-
lecting, and disseminating cases of intervention and by helping to build
and maintain the network of practitioners. (for further discussion of
inductive planning, see Schon, 1971).
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Conclusion
From our study we have concluded that the method of quasi-
experiment is only partly applicable to community-level nutrition
interventions. We found it possible, after the fact of experiment, to clear
up some, but by no means all of the sources of ambiguity due to dirty
data and confounding changes of context. We found that attempts to
make a closer approximation to the methods of &dquo;true&dquo; experiment
produced no further reduction in indeterminacy; indeed, in some cases,
they added to it. We found, finally, that the epistemological assump-
tions underlying the methods of true and quasi-experiment are not true
to the experience of nutrition interventions. Social phenomena are
lawful only within the self-created and self-maintained conditions of
unique behavioral worlds. Problems and variables are not given with the
situation but are constructed by the inquirer who frames and reframes
them in the course of a transaction with the situation in which he or she
contributes to the creation of the phenomena, including their uncer-
tainty and uniqueness, which he or she also observes.
In reflections-in-action, we have proposed a method of experiment
appropriate to these findings. It is at once a proposal for the practical
use of local information systems, a methodological proposal for on-the-
spot experiments and mid-course corrections, and an epistemological
proposal for objectives and norms suited to the actual experience of
intervention in situations of instability, uncertainty, and uniqueness.
In our view, the inquirer should bring to the intervention situation an
initial understanding of the situation, a framing of the problem, and an
intervention-hypothesis, all of which will be subjected to iterative
revision through the learning sequence of on-the-spot experiment. He or
she monitors experimental data on-line, and conducts mid-course
analyses in order to revise data collecting procedures, discriminates
among rival hypotheses, redesigns the interventions, and restructures
the description and framing of the problematic situation. He or she tries
to use hypothesis-testing experiments to arrive at internally valid
inferences, but only within the bounds of efforts to affirm the
intervention. His or her conclusions are always relative to the unique-
ness of the case and to the framing of the problem. He or she seeks to
work closely with local practitioners and participants in order to draw
on their insights and gain their involvement in the experiment.
Objectivity in the sense of neutrality and independence of person is not
the goal. Once the appreciations that shape interpretations and behavior
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have been determined, he or she is able to affirm an intervention in a
unique case, which may become part of a repertoire of cases, a source of
exemplars for the construction of initial understandings of other unique
cases. The inquiry does not yield general policy advice but adds to a
repertoire of cases from which other inquirers may learn as they frame
the unique problems of other family-resembling situations.
Notes
1. Controversies over the "Negative Income Tax" and "Housing Allowance" expen-
ments are cases in point. A very interesting recent discussion of the former is Leland
Neuberg’s Notes on the Conceptual Basis of Social Controlled Experimentation (manu-
script in preparation).
2. The tradition has been most prominently represented in the United States by Kurt
Levin and some of his students and intellectual descendants.
3. There is not a single major thesis advanced by either nineteenth-century
Positivists or the Vienna Circle that has not been devastatingly criticized when
measured by the Positivists’ own standards for philosophical argument. The
original formulations of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy and the venfiability
criterion of meaning has been abandoned. It has effectively shown that the
Positivists’ understanding of the natural sciences and the formal disciplines is
grossly oversimplified. Whatever one’s final judgment about the current
disputes in the post-empiricist philosophy and history of science ... there is
rational agreement about the inadequacy of the original Positivist under-
standing of science, knowledge and meaning [Bernstein, 1976: 207].
4. He limits his use of the term "instability" to instability of measures, "fluctuations m
sampling persons or components, autonomous instability of repeated or ’equivalent’
measures" (Campbell, 1969: 411). However, he includes instability of environment in his
category, "history: events other than the expenmental treatment, occurring between
pre-test and post-test and thus providing alternate explanations of effects" (1969: 411).
5. Herbst’s usage of the term, "behavior world," is paralleled in Argyns and Schon,
Theory in Practice, where the authors describe the behavioral worlds created and
maintained by individuals who regularly bring certain theories of interpersonal action to
their encounters with one another. In these authors’ examples, such worlds may be
characterized by features such as high or low defensiveness, openness, warmth, win/ lose
behavior, and the like. Argyris and Schon share, with Herbst, the emphasis on the
self-created character of behavioral worlds, and on the work that goes into their creation
and maintenance.
Other researchers have also described behavioral worlds (with or without explicit use
of that term), and have emphasized one or more of their features. Bateson (1972) describes
the patterns of "zero-order learning, that is, of contmual stability-maintaining error-
detection and correction, which characterize human organization.
6. The term is borrowed from Geoffrey Vickers.
7. In Essential Tension, Thomas Kuhn has spoken of the function of exemplars in the
process of scientific evolution, as in the process by which a student learns a science. Kuhn
believes that a physics student, for example, learns certain canonical problems (e.g., the
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problem of calculating the accelleration, etc. of a ball rolling down an inclined plane). He
is then able to perceive similarities between these problems and others, before he can say
"similar in respect to what." What Kuhn earlier called a "paradigm" he now believes to be
better described as a set of exemplars, shared by the members of a community of inquiry.
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